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Some Future Contingents and Aristotle1 
Andrew J. Turner
Aristotle argued that particular statements about the future were neither true nor 
false. I reject this claim, arguing that implicit to such a theory is an untenable theory 
of time. Whilst developing a theory of time was not Aristotle’s intent, I believe his 
view does entail an ontology that is questionable at best. Once we have sorted out 
an acceptable theory of time, the only reasonable conclusions about all statements 
is that they are true or false. Th at we do not know whether our statements about the 
future are true or false is an epistemological problem. Th is claim is aimed at those 
(not necessarily Aristotle) who wish to adopt Aristotle’s view today.
Introduction
In chapter 9 of De Interpretatione, Aristotle argues that some statements about the 
future are neither true nor false. His conclusion relies upon the distinction between 
the law of the excluded middle and the law of bivalence. Th e law of the excluded 
middle holds that for any x, x either exists or it does not. Th e law of bivalence holds 
that for any statement s, s is either true or false. Aristotle thought bivalence did not 
apply to the future: contingent statements about future events are neither true nor 
false. I will argue that bivalence does apply to statements about the future. Th at we 
cannot recognise this, refl ects an epistemological problem. I will reject Aristotle’s 
claim that statements about the future are neither true nor false, because it relies on 
an untenable philosophy of time.2 
1 I would like to thank Chris Mortensen and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions and 
input.
2 Th e focus of this paper is on the ontological commitments of Aristotle’s claims, rather than the 
reasons he had for making these claims. Furthermore, I am not interested in showing how or why 
Aristotle’s argument goes wrong. Rather I am merely interested in looking at his conclusions in 
light of recent developments in the Philosophy of Time. As such, this paper is not interested in 
criticising Aristotle for holding such views, but only in showing that we have no reasons for agree-
ing with him.
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Aristotle and the sea battle
Suppose there is a sea battle tomorrow. Aristotle thinks we cannot say of that battle 
whether side A or side B is victorious. Whilst Aristotle thinks that the law of biva-
lence applies to the present and past, statements about the future are neither true 
nor false. Since the sea battle would be in the future if it occurs, we cannot say who 
will be victorious. But, Aristotle thinks it is 
true that there will, or will not actually be a 
sea battle tomorrow: the law of the excluded 
middle still applies. Th is distinguishes Biva-
lence from the law of the excluded middle: 
bivalence only applies to the present and 
past, the law of the excluded middle applies 
to the past, present and fu ture.
Suppose that there will be a sea battle 
between A and B tomorrow. Either A will 
win, or B will win. Th e law of the excluded 
middle means that only one of these states of 
aff airs occurs. Now suppose that bivalence 
applies to statements about this sea battle. If 
A wins, proposition P  “Side A is the winner”, 
is true. If Side B wins, proposi tion P,  “Side A 
is the winner”, is false. Aristotle thinks that 
this implies that determinism is true, and 
hence rejects bivalence. 
Suppose this battle occurred this morn ing 
and side A won. If determinism is true then 
it was true before the battle that A wins the sea fi ght. If it was always true to say that 
“Side A is the winner” then it seems impossible that side B should be victorious. “All, 
then, that is about to be must of necessity take place” (Aristotle, De Int. 9, 18b15).
Aristotle thinks this claim untenable. It seems strange to say that the outcome 
of the battle was determined three thousand years ago, not by the actions of the 
sides on the day. Aristotle believes that if determinism were true, we would not 
need to deliberate about actions. We could predict actions ten thousand years 
before they occur. 
For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, and another may 
predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment in the past will of 
necessity take place in the fullness of time (Aristotle, De Int.,18b30).
Aristotle believes that predictions do not make the predicted event occur, or not 
occur, they have no causal effi  cacy. However, actions and deliberation unlike 
predictions do have causal effi  cacy. If we can deliberate about the future, then it is 
Aristotle (384–322 BC).
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not true of future events that they necessarily will or necessarily will not take place. 
In some cases there are real alternatives. Where we deliberate between two actions, 
either is possible. Aristotle believes determinism is false. I do not want to take issue 
with Aristotle here, merely set out his reasons for claiming that bivalence does not 
apply to certain statements about the future.
Aristotle believes that determinism follows from the claim that the laws of biva-
lence and the excluded middle hold for past, present and future statements and 
events. If determinism is to be rejected, Aristotle is faced with a harsh choice, reject 
the law of excluded middle, or reject bivalence, where the future is concerned. He 
chooses to reject bivalence. 
Everything must either be or not be, whether in the present or in the future, but it is 
not always possible to distinguish and state determinately which of these alternatives 
must necessarily come about (Ari stotle, De Int., 19a25).
But Aristotle never explains why he rejects bivalence in favour of the law of the 
excluded middle, though he does give us hints: “that which is must needs be when 
it is, and that which is not must needs not be when it is not” (Aristotle, De Int., 
19a20).
Having rejected bivalence Aristotle feels free to reject determinism. Determin-
ism was only adopted because of the conjunction of the law of the excluded middle 
and bivalence. Remove this conjunction and the problem may be resolved. We may 
think it the easy option, but also the most reasonable one.
Future events like sea battles either will or will not occur, so the law of the ex-
cluded middle applies. Aristotle claims that it is true of events that they either occur 
or do not occur. But this is not true of our beliefs about events. Th e law of the ex-
cluded middle remains, but the law of bivalence is rejected. Recall the above quote.
Where we deliberate between two actions, either is possible. Everything must either 
be or not be, whether in the present or in the future, but it is not always possible to 
distinguish and state determinately which of these alternatives must necessarily come 
about (Aristotle, De Int., 9, 19a25).
Should we allow a follower of Aristotle this escape? I think not, for it relies on an 
untenable philosophy of time.3 
Th e open future
Anyone wishing to adopt Aristotle’s claim requires a qualitative diff erence between 
the future and the past. Such a qualitative requires a particular metaphysics of 
time.4 Let us try to build this metaphysics by fi rst claiming that if there is to be a 
3 The point is also epistemological, since Aristotle here talks about our inability to talk about, deter-
mine, or know which case occurs. This does not rule out determinism, since determinism being 
true is compatible with our belief that it is false.
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qualitative diff erence between the future and the past, then there must be some 
privileged moment in time that distinguishes between the two. Th is is the moment 
when the future changes from being unreal to being real.5 Since there must be a 
diff erence between the future and the past, the past must also be real. Call this 
moment the “now”. 
Th e “now”, it is supposed, moves from the past into the future, though we have 
no clear understanding of how this occurs. One view is that existence moves from 
the past into the future through the “now”. Th is occurs much in the same way that 
a wave moves across the surface of the sea.6 Th is rather rough analogy gives us an 
idea of what might be involved, but any attempt to develop such an analogy beyond 
its rough state has proved problematic.7 Attempts tend to focus on events chang-
ing from being future, to being present,8 but no account of a mechanism for this 
change has been provided.
Given this problem, how might the “now” work? Events “move” in some way 
from being in the future, to being present to being in the past. Th ey do this be-
cause existence moves from the past, into the present and into the future. But we 
need to be clear here, events themselves do not move, but their ontological status 
does. Saying an event moves gives the impression that events move like a car 
moves. Rather saying an event moves is a defl ected way of saying that the event is 
future and will become present.9 Future events become real when the “now” con-
fers existence on them. Th is is the now of our experience. Call this the dynamic 
view of time. Th ere are many versions of the dynamic view but the one most 
aligned to Aristotle’s position here is the open future: whereby the past is fi xed, the 
present confers existence and the future is open. Aristotle believes that past tensed 
statements are true or false, but future tensed ones are neither true nor false. Th e 
best way to explain this is to say that the past is fi xed, but the future open. Aristotle 
claims at the opening of Chapter 9, that in “the case of that which is or which has 
4 Dyke, 2003, has identified a tendency in many of the arguments about time to move from facts 
about language to facts about ontology. It has to be noted that this was not Aristotle’s concern. If 
Dyke is correct, and I think she is, then the correct move is to develop our ontology and then ask 
what that ontology says about our linguistic expressions. Aristotle is concerned with the truth of 
propositions, whereas I am concerned with the truth-conditions of these propositions. I believe 
these are the crucial questions; they may not have been Aristotle’s concern, but anyone wishing to 
adopt his view should give an account of the ontology behind such a view.
5 By real or unreal I mean that something is real if it exists, unreal if it does not exist. A ghost is 
unreal since they do not exist (if they do not) whereas the Earth is real, since it exists.
6 See Maudlin, 1992, for this claim.
7 See Smart, 1949, for a concerted attack on this analogy. Markosian, (1993) makes an attempt to 
develop the analogy but he soon turns to linguistic, not ontological means to do so. 
8 See Lowe, 1998, for this general strategy.
9 It is for this reason that McTaggart argued that time requires there to be two series; one that 
incorporates the movement of time, and one that incorporates the stability of events in an order of 
occurrence: 1958 comes aft er 1957 and before 1959 for example.
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taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false” (Ari s-
totle, De Int., 18a25). Compare this with his claim in the following paragraph that 
“that which is predicated of it [an individual (event)] relates to the future, the case is 
altered” (Aristotle, De Int., 18a30).
Other types of dynamic views include presentism, where only the present is 
real. But since according to presentism the past and the future are both unreal, 
there is no qualitative diff erence to do the work for Aristotle. Th e open future view 
gives us the required qualitative diff erence between the present and the past, both 
real, and the future, which is unreal. However, I will argue that the dynamic view 
in all of its forms makes no sense. Th ere are several arguments against the dynamic 
view but I will focus on just two, one analytical, one scientifi c. 
First the analytical argument. Th e analytic claim is based on the premises that if 
time is dynamic, our understanding of that dynamism ought to be simple and clear. 
An analytic test might hold that our explanation should be clear, rationally obvious 
and fi ts within an acceptable logical structure. It turns out that our understanding 
of time, if a dynamic view is adopted, is confusing at best, and confused at worst. 
Take some event, e. We say e is either past or present or future. It is not possible 
for e to be past and present and future. But it turns out that event e is past and is 
present and is future. Th is is a contradiction, one that McTaggart (1908) thought 
showed that time could not be dynamic.
We could say that event e attracts diff erent tensed statements simultaneously 
and that this dissolves the contradiction. Event e is “said to be present”, “said to be 
future” and “said to be past”. Since the talk here is about linguistic expressions, 
event e it turns out is not simultaneously past, present and real. Th is escape however 
is not allowed, since we then ask which of these statements about e, is true. If all 
three are true, then they are only, it seems to me, true because of the state-of-af-
fairs that they describe. Since they describe three contradictory states-of-aff airs, the 
contradiction is reintroduced. We can only remove the contradiction if we divorce 
our language from our ontology. But our ontology underlies our language in ways 
that such a divorce ignore. Th ink for example, of a simple claim, “it is hot”. If the 
place referred to by the “it” is not hot then this statement is false; if it is hot, then this 
statement is true. Th e truth of the statement is determined by the state-of-aff airs. 
Another response here is to claim that e is not past and present and future 
simultaneously in the way that I have construed it. Every event is either past or 
present or future. We say of event e, that e is present, was future and will be past. 
McTaggart gives two reasons why such a claim cannot be made.
First, we are trying to explain time. Our explanation needs to remove the possi bi-
lity of events being simultaneously past, present and future. So we say that these pre-
dicates apply successively. But this invokes time. To ensure that event e is either past 
or present or future rather than past, present and future, we have used succession; a 
temporal concept. We have assumed the existence of time to prove the existence of 
time, and this begs the question. If we are to prove the existence of time, we need 
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independent reasons to derive a conclusion. Introducing the conclusion as a premiss 
of the argument would beg the question.
Second, we might try and remove the contradictions of the fi rst time by em-
ploying a second time series to remove the contradictions in the fi rst time series. 
Take time t to be the time when event e occurs. Time t is past, present and future. 
To avoid this we introduce a second time series such that we say of time t that it is 
present at time t1, past at time t2 and future at time t0. Th e trouble is that for each 
moment in this second time series, take t1 for example, our three predicates apply 
simultaneously to that moment. Th is means that to remove the contradictions 
in our second time series we require a third time series. But such a move merely 
pushes the problem up a level. We are entered into an infi nite and vicious regress.
So analytically there is a problem for a claim that there is a “now” that distin-
guishes between the past and future. Th e claim that there is involves a contradic-
tion: events are past, present and future. Th e claim that time is dynamic fails the 
analytical test. To turn briefl y to science to develop criticisms against concerns that 
are not Aristotle’s. Th ese concerns are central to anybody who wishes to follow 
Aristotle’ view however.
I have claimed that to distinguish between the past and future we need a uni-
verse wide moment, the “now”. Anything simultaneous to event e, exists because 
it is caught in this privileged moment. But the Special and General Th eories of 
Relativity (GR) show that there can be no universe-wide moment of simultaneity. 
To say that two events, x and y, are simultaneous we need to invoke a frame of refer-
ence within which that simultaneity holds. However, there exist other frames where 
x and y are not simultaneous, and these frame are just as legitimate. 
To see how this works take a frame of reference where x exists then y exists, call 
this frame, F. In frame F, x exists but y is future, so non-existent. But there is a frame 
where x and y are simultaneous, call this frame G. We cannot distinguish between 
F and G, since both are legitimate Frames of Reference in GR, so both readings are 
correct. Th is means that we cannot infer the non-existence of y, merely because it is 
not simultaneous to x in Frame F. Coincidentally there is a frame where y is present, 
but x is past, Frame H. Th is means simultaneity cannot confer existence in the way 
that we think the “now” does. 
We have three frames where existence is spread out across the past, present and 
future, but there is no qualitative diff erence between the three times (and frames). Th is 
means that the notion of simultaneity, needed for a universal “now” is really only 
local. Th e “now” has no ontological status. Furthermore, there is no qualitative dif-
ference between the past and the future.
I have quickly looked at an analytical and scientifi c argument against the exist-
ence of the “now”. If such a moment is rejected, there is no moment in time to dis-
tinguish between an undetermined future and determined past. Th ey are equally 
real. Th is is what we call the static view of time.
Th e static view entails that Aristotle is wrong when he concludes that bivalence 
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does not apply to future events. Such a claim relies on there being a qualitative dif-
ference, but no diff erence exists. Th e most that Aristotle could (now) claim is that 
we do not know whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow. Th at there will or 
will not be a sea battle is already determined. Th at we cannot make any judgement 
about this fact is a fault in our knowledge: in short, an epistemological fact.
Truth
How might this argument be fl eshed out? First, propositions are objectively true. 
Take our sea battle tomorrow. Th e proposition P “Side A is the winner”, is made true 
by a state-of-aff airs. Th e state-of-aff airs being the defeat of side B by side A, and this 
exists in the world. Th is means that whenever someone says, thinks or believes that 
“Side A is the winner”, that tokening of the proposition is true. (P is true even if 
nobody in any culture at any time says or thinks it.) What makes my utterance that 
“Side A is the winner” true is a fact derived from the world itself.10
Some more needs to be said, I think, about this state-of-aff airs claim. Th ese 
state-of-aff airs act as the truth-makers for our statements. Truth-makers are facts 
“in virtue of which sentences and/or propositions are true” (Mulligan, Simons and 
Smith, 1984:287, original emphasis). Since truth-makers are facts, they must exist 
if they are to make statements true. Th ere are two ways to take this; fi rst truth-
makers are coincident with their statement, or second, truth-makers are coinci-
dent with the events described by the original sentence; the state-of-aff airs acts as 
the truth-maker. Th is I will argue is the preferable option.
First we could say that truth-makers for statements exist when the statement 
is made. So my statement “there was a sea battle yesterday” is made today, so the 
truth-maker for this sentence exists today. One problem with this is that the sea 
battle occurred yesterday, not today. So what truth-maker for my claim exists now? 
We might respond here that currently existing evidence acts as the grounds for the 
truth of my statement. Th is seems reasonable about statements about sea-battles 
in the recent past. But what about claims about distant (in time) events such as 
“dinosaurs existed!”? Th e evidence for this claim is quite obscure, restricted to the 
fossil record and so on. 
A second way to think of truth-makers is that events and objects themselves act as 
the truth-makers. As such my statement today that “there was a sea battle yesterday” 
is made true by the sea battle itself. Th ere is no reliance upon presently existing 
10 Some have argued that propositions etc., derive their truth-value from the moment of assessment 
(see, eg. McFarlane 2003, who argues that context of assessments must be involved in deriving 
the truth-values of contingent statements). If this is the case, then future contingents can neither 
be true nor false since the event they describe has yet to happen. But this is simply the problem 
restated. This solution ignores the theory of time which, as I have argued shows that the future is 
as real as the present and past. If so then the context of assessment only becomes relevant when 
assessing how we know about certain (future) events. This would be appropriate for a linguistic 
inclined philosopher. I argue that such a move is inappropriate for a metaphysician.
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evidence as there is in the fi rst case. Th is, it seems to me, is the more reasonable 
truth-maker theory and it is the one I now adopt.11 One problem for such a view is 
that many statements are about distant (in time) events, such that the person mak-
ing the statement has no direct access to the truth-maker. Th is problem indicates 
that the problems about such statements are epistemological, not ontological.
Having adopted this second conception of truth-makers we can return to Ari s-
totle’s claim that statements about the past and present are either true or false. For 
this to hold there must be some fact of the matter about the past (or in the past as I 
am now claiming) to make statements such as “there was a sea battle yesterday and 
side A won” true or false. Th ere must be some state-of-aff airs in the world to act as 
a truth-maker for my tokening of this statement true. Similarly, statements about 
the present, such as “it is now raining” is made true or false by the state-of-aff airs 
of it raining today.
Th ese rules apply to past and present tensed statements, so why not to future 
tensed statements? Aristotle’s claim that they do not apply to the future relies on 
there being a qualitative diff erence between the past, the present and the future. 
But since there is no diff erence to do this work, Aristotle’s claim is undone. Th ere is 
no ontological diff erence between past and future states-of-aff airs, such that state-
ments about the past are true or false but those about the future are neither. If past 
tensed statements are true or false, so are future tensed statements true or false. Th e 
law of bivalence applies equally. 
Take a statement “there was a sea battle yesterday and Side A won” this is made 
true or false by some state-of-aff airs that existed yesterday. Take a comparable 
statement “there will be a sea battle tomorrow and side A will be victorious”, this 
statement is either true or false, and this is decided by some state-of-aff airs that 
exists tomorrow. Since there is no ontological diff erence between the two states-
of-aff airs we cannot claim, as Aristotle does, that bivalence only applies to the past 
and present. It applies to them all or to none of them. We must I believe, conclude 
that Aristotle is wrong: bivalence does apply to statements about future-contin-
gents. Th e problem becomes one of why we do not know whether future-tensed 
statements are true or false.
Th e distinction between bivalence and 
the law of the excluded middle
Aristotle drew his conclusion by removing bivalence from statements about the 
future. Th is requires us to distinguish between bivalence and the law of the 
excluded middle. For either there is or is not going to be a sea battle tomorrow. 
11 Tarski (1944:343) agues that a sentence, if true, designates, or picks out an existing states-of-affairs: 
this favours my interpretation here, since it follows that only an existing states-of-affairs can act as 
a truth-maker. Furthermore, this states-of-affairs must act as the truth-maker.
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Since bivalence does apply to the future as well as the past and present, ought we 
to distinguish between the two in the way that Aristotle does? I believe that we 
should not, or at least, not in the signifi cant way that Aristotle does. Th ere does 
seem to be a need for the distinction. Bivalence applies to statements and the law of 
the excluded middle applies to the world, independent of statements about it. But 
bivalence merely appears to be a semantic equivalent to the ontology of the law of 
the excluded middle. But being “equivalent to” does not mean to be “distinguished 
from”, though they oft en go together. Being equivalent to is oft en taken as the start 
in a reductionist move, from one to the other. Th e mind is equivalent to the brain, 
so they are the same.
Bivalence certainly looks like a semantic equivalent to the law of the excluded 
middle. Statements are either true or false. If so, then we ought to think of bivalence 
as a semantic version of the law of the excluded middle. Aristotle’s distinction relies 
on the claim that bivalence only applies to the past and present, whilst the law of 
the excluded middle applies to all times. I have rejected this claim, so the distinc-
tion between the two becomes somewhat weaker. Th ere is a diff erence between the 
two, but only in type, not in range. Bivalence is the semantic equivalent to the law 
of the excluded middle.
Conclusion
Aristotle’s argument for the contingent state of the future relies on there being 
a qualitative diff erence between the future and past. I have argued that no such 
diff erence exists. Th is means we ought not to distinguish between the law of the 
excluded middle and bivalence. With no privileged moment in time we cannot 
distinguish between the future and the past or present. Bivalence applies equally 
to statements about the past, the present and the future. Th at we cannot recognise 
or know the truth of statements about the future refl ects an epistemological prob-
lem. Aristotle’s claim that statements about the future are neither true nor false is 
rejected.
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